There is abundant literature in experimental research on decision making under risk, which compares, and ranks subjects' preferences on the basis of some elicitation method. The present paper performs a similar analysis in order to compare them. Since pricing data lead in many cases to some anomalies (i.e. status quo bias, endowment effect) we examine three mechanisms to elicit price preferences: willingness-to-pay in a second price auction, willingness-toaccept in a second price auction, and certainty equivalent elicited with BDM. A Bayesian interpretation of our results suggests that it is not possible to state ex-ante the more appropriate elicitation method for a particular subject: for 1/3 of our sample WTP is preferred, for 1/3 of our sample WTA is preferred, and for the remaining 1/3 BDM is preferred.
INTRODUCTION
Experimental research on decision making under risk elicits subjects' preferences using different price elicitation methods. Usually, in most practical applications, price elicitation is implemented using matching procedures (Tversky et al., 1988) e.g. willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept in contingent valuation studies or the time-trade-off method in health economics. Many empirical studies have shown that matching procedures may lead to fundamentally different results. These phenomena are usually referred to as response mode effects. In general, response mode effects may be caused by errors in the subjects' responses. A well known response mode effect in decision making under risk is the preference reversal phenomenon first observed by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) . Most prominent in this context seems to be the disparity between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept discussed by Coursey et al (1987) and Sinden (1984, 1987) . Coppinger et al (1980) and Cox et al (1982) showed that when certainty equivalents are elicitated through willingness-to-pay in a second-price auction, there are subjects who deliberately and consistently under-bid. Similarly, in attempts to elicit certainty equivalents through willingnessto-accept in second-price auctions, it would appear that many subjects over-ask. This disparity is often explained by a status-quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988 ) and leads to the question which of both measures should be used in contingent valuation studies. A third mechanism, that appears to be neutral in that, is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) but, nevertheless, it may be the case that subjects find the procedure too complicated and adopt some simple heuristic which biases behaviour. In this paper we will address the following question: given a particularly utility function, which elicitation method should be preferred? This is an important question since the results of an experiment can be affected by the elicitation method. Different elicitation methods may induce different behaviour towards risk.
Studies of Isaac and James (2000) and Berg et al (2005) show that subjects' risk attitudes usually differ fundamentally across several institutions, including the BDM mechanism as well as first-price and second-price auctions.1 Section 2 describes the experimental design, explains our estimation procedure. Section 4 presents our results and, finally, section 5 contains a concluding discussion.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was conducted at the Centre of Experimental Economics at the University of York with 24 participants. Each subject had to attend five separate occasions within one week, one per day. The single occasions were called occasion A, B, C, D, and E respectively. Every participant had to register for 5 separate occasions, two times for occasion A/B and one time for occasions C, D, and E respectively ( During the five days of this week one occasion was offered on every single day with varying chronological order. The participants could choose on which day they attended which session. Since at most six students were allowed in one session the order in which sessions were completed varied sufficiently between participants. Sessions lasted between 25 and 40 minutes. The time varied not only among treatments but also across subjects. After a subject had completed all five treatments one question of one treatment was selected randomly and played out for real. The average payment to the subjects was £34.17 with £80 being the highest and £0 being the lowest payment. There was no showup fee, but subjects received an initial endowment for willingness-to-pay questions in order to prevent losses (see the experimental instructions in the appendix). Only occasions C, D, and E will be analysed in the present paper.
In occasions C, D, and E the subjects were presented the same 60 lotteries 2 , 56 risky ones and 4 ambiguous ones (which are not analysed in this paper). The 56 risky lotteries are reported in Table 2 .
The lotteries were presented as segmented circles on the computer screen (see figure 1) . In the three occasions subjects have to:
• report a maximal buying price (bid) for each of the 56 lotteries. We call this the WTP session;
• report a minimal selling price (ask) for each of the 56 lotteries. We call this the WTA session;
• report a certainty equivalent (CE) for each of the 56 lotteries. We call this the CE session.
2 The order of presentation of the lotteries in each treatment was randomized.
For all sessions we used incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms. Bids (asks) were elicited with second-price sealed-bid (offer) auctions (Coppinger et all, 1980) , while for the certainty equivalents we employed the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. Since subjects participated in the experiment in five different treatments it is important to mention that all recruited subjects had to show up for all sessions.
Figure 1:
A segmented circles lottery presented to the subjects during the experiment
ESTIMATION METHOD
In this section we discuss the main conceptual issues of our estimation method. When we are using certainty equivalent estimation we need to know the value of the utility at outcome values other than x 1 , x 2 , x 3 and x 4 . This requires assuming a particular functional form for subjects' utility. We assume that subjects have a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function 3 . We adopt the following specific form: u(x) = (x/40) r . We need to estimate only the parameter r (the relative risk aversion coefficient) as it fully describes the utility function of the individual. If the subject is asked to provide his or her certainty equivalent for some gamble G, we will assume that the subject calculates the Expected Utility 4 of the gamble, according to his or her utility function, and then calculates V -that is, certain amount of money that yields the same utility. We can now write u(V) = EU(G). However, if we acknowledge the existence of error, then we have u(V) = EU(G) + ε, and can hence note that the probability density of V being reported as the certainty equivalent of the gamble, is given by f{u -1 [EU(G) + ε]}, where f(.) is the probability density function of ε. Let us assume that the measurement error ε is distributed as a N(0,s 2 ) -we can proceed to the estimation of the parameters by maximum likelihood 5 .
RESULTS
We estimate individual preferences functions subject by subject as players clearly differ in their preferences. In order to estimate individual preferences we shall calculate the utility function u(x) as defined in section 3. As already mentioned, all we need to estimate in order to define the individual preference function is the parameter r, as it gives a complete account of the utility function of the individual. Subsequently we will estimate the log-likelihood values of our estimates which provide a first measurement of their goodness of fit.
Subjects 20 and 21 are straight-down-the-line risk neutral all the time: their certainty equivalents are always equal to the expected values. Other subjects are not so clear cut.
In table 2 we present the estimations obtained using the three elicitation methods. Looking at these results we can draw some preliminary considerations:
1. in the WTP treatment, r is between 0 and 5.474. 14 subjects are risk averse, 2 subjects are risk neutral (i.e. subjects 20 and 21) and 8 subjects are risk loving It is interesting to note that only for 12 out of 22 subjects the attitude toward risk does not change with the elicitation methods. This result suggests that choosing one elicitation method instead of another one can dramatically affect the shape of the subjects' preference.
If we adopt a Bayesian interpretation of the results, and start with equal priors on the three elicitation methods, then the posterior probabilities of the WTP, WTA, and CE elicitation method being the most appropriate one are respectively:
We have applied this analysis to each subject and present the results graphically in Figure 2 . In these triangles we represent the probability of the CE elicitation method being correct on the horizontal axis, and the probability of the WTA elicitation method being correct on the vertical axis.
The probability of the WTP elicitation method being correct is the residual. In the triangle subjects are indicated by a number. The triangles are divided into three areas -the one to the top being where the CE elicitation method is most probable, the one to the right being where the WTA elicitation method is most probable and the one nearest the origin being where the WTP elicitation method is most probable. We note that there are 7 subjects in the "CE most likely area", 8 subjects in the "WTA most likely area" and just 7 subjects in the "WTP most likely" area.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have compared three different price elicitation methods. We concerned with the important question: which method is the 'best' one to elicit price preferences? We have analysed three standard elicitation methods, willingness-to-pay, willingness-to-accept, and certainty equivalents obtained by the BDM mechanism. Our experimental data show that none of these is can be considered the 'best' elicitation method. Altogether -we find evidence that -for 1/3 of our subject pool, willingness-to-pay may be the 'best' elicitation method; for another 1/3, willingnessto-accept may be the 'best' elicitation method; and for the last 1/3 of our subject pool, certainty equivalents obtained by the BDM mechanism may be the 'best' elicitation method. This is an important result since if one does not know anything about a subject; it may be best first to run a pilot in order to choose the best elicitation method , and then use that method for eliciting subject's preference. We can conclude that in order to better elicit different subjects price preference can be the case to use different elicitation methods. which the arrow on the wheel stops. The number in each segment states the probability that the arrow on the wheel will stop in this segment, that is the probability that you will win the amount of money represented by this segment. For instance, the circle above represents a lottery in which you win £10 with a probability of 50%, £30 with a probability of 20%, and £40 with a probability of 30%. For the experiment you should clarify yourself that it is never reasonable to pay more for a lottery than the highest possible amount you can win in this lottery. That is, the opportunity to play out the lottery depicted above can never be worth more than £40. If you remember this, it is impossible that you incur a loss in this experiment.
The single occasions are called occasions A, B, C, D, and E respectively. More precise instructions will be provided by us at the beginning of each occasion.
Every participant has to register for 5 separate occasions, two times for occasion A/B and one time for occasions C, D, and E respectively. At each meeting at most 15 participants are allowed. 
Instructions to Occasion C Introduction
Recall that you have to make decisions with respect to 60 lotteries in all of the five occasions. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select one question from one of the five occasions and play it out for real. In this occasion the 60 lotteries are grouped to 30 pairs and with respect to every pair you are asked three different questions.
What are the questions?
In this occasion a pair of lotteries appears on the screen and, as the first question, you have to state whether you prefer the left lottery, or the right lottery, or whether you do not care which lottery you will receive. After that, the same lottery pair appears again on the screen and, as the second and third question, you are asked for each of both lotteries: "State the amount of money such that you do not care whether you will receive this amount or the depicted lottery". All you have to do is to type this amount in the corresponding box.
How is your reward calculated?
If the first question is selected for you reward, you will play out the lottery you preferred. For the case that you have answered "don't care", the experimenter will select randomly one lottery of the given pair and this lottery will be played out.
If the second or third questions is selected for your reward, we will determine randomly a number z between 0 and y, where y is the highest possible prize in the given lottery. If z is greater or equal than the amount you stated, you will receive £z as reward. If z is less than the amount you stated, you can play out the given lottery.
How should you response?
Concerning the preference between and the monetary evaluation of the two lotteries of a given pair, there are obviously no preferences or evaluations which are objectively "right" or "wrong". However,
given your personal preference and evaluations according to your own taste, the reward mechanism described above definitely guarantees that it is in your own interest to respond always with your true preference and true evaluation in all three types of questions. In the following we want to explain you why this is true. For the question on the first screen this is immediately comprehensible since your choice determines the lottery you will play out.
Occasion D Introduction
Recall that you have to make decisions with respect to 60 lotteries in all of the five occasions. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select one question from one of the five occasions and play it out for real. In this occasion you have to answer exactly one question for every single lottery out of the 60 lotteries.
What are the questions?
In this occasion the lotteries are auctioned by a second-price sealed-bid auction. Sealed-bid means that every bidder submits her/his bid secretly, i.e. you do not know the bids of the other bidders and the other bidders do not know your bid. Second-price means that the bidder with the highest bid receives the auctioned lottery and has to pay a price which equals precisely the second highest bid. In other words, if you have the highest bid among all bidders you do not have to pay your own bid but only the second highest bid in order to receive the lottery. In this occasion a lottery appears on the screen and you are asked: "Submit your bid for this lottery in a second-price sealed-bid auction".
How is your reward calculated?
If a question of occasion D is selected for your reward you first receive a constant payment of £y, where y is the highest possible prize of the lottery, which is involved in this question. Moreover, if your are the subject with the highest bid among all subjects in the group you made occasion D, you receive the corresponding lottery and have to pay the second highest bid.
How should you determine your bid?
Obviously the price you are at most willing to pay for a given lottery just depends on your own preferences, it cannot be objectively "right" or "wrong". However, given the price you are personally at most willing to pay for a given lottery it is in your own interest to submit exactly this price as bid for the lottery. In the following we want to explain you why this is true.
Note that your bid has no influence on the price you pay for the lottery, it just decides whether you will receive the lottery for a given price or not. Suppose the price you are at most willing to pay for the given lottery is for example £31.04. Then you should bid, as we show you in the sequel, also 
Introduction
What are the questions?
In this occasion you are endowed with a lottery and you have to make an offer for selling the lottery in a second-price offer auction. In a second-price offer auction every subject submits her/his offer secretly, i.e. you do not know the offers of the other subjects and the other subjects do not know your offer. Now the subject with the lowest offer sells the lottery and receives an amount equal to the second lowest offer. In other words, if you have submitted the lowest offer you will sell the lottery for the second lowest offer, which is higher than your own offer. In this occasion a lottery appears on the screen and you are asked: "Submit your offer for this lottery in a second-price offer auction."
How is your reward calculated?
Suppose a question of occasion E is selected for your reward. If you have submitted the lowest offer among all the subjects in the group you made occasion E, you receive as the reward the second lowest offer. If you have not submitted the lowest offer you can play out as reward the given lottery.
How should you determine your offer?
Obviously the price you have to receive at least in order that you are willing to sell a given lottery just depends on your own preferences, it cannot be objectively "right" or "wrong". However, given the price that you have to receive at least in order that you are personally willing to sell the given lottery, it is in your own interest to submit exactly this price as offer for the lottery. In the following we want to explain you why this is true.
Note that your offer has no influence on the price you receive for the lottery, it just decides whether you will sell the lottery for a given price or not. Suppose you are willing to sell the given lottery if you receive at least a compensation of, for example, £19.47. Then you should submit, as we show you in the sequel, also an offer of £19.47. Suppose you would submit a higher offer, for example £ 25.55. If the lowest offer among all other bidders is lower than £19.47, this does not change anything since you will play out the given lottery in both cases. If the lowest offer among all other bidders is higher than £25.55, for instance £27.83, this does also not change anything since you receive £27.83 in both cases. Now suppose the lowest offer among all other bidders is £24.08. If you submit £25.55 as
